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Anti-Guest Statutes and Marital Moffatt Hancock*
Immunity for Torts in Conflict
of Laws:
Techniques for Resolving
Ostensible True Conflict Cases
and Constitutional Limitations
1. Historical Introduction
In the now historic case of Babcock v. Jackson,' decided in
1963, the New York Court of Appeals introduced an
apparently2 novel mode of analyzing tort choice-of-law issues
that has achieved remarkable popularity with the judges of
other states. It has been adopted in tort cases where the facts
and issues were quite different from those of Babcock v.
Jackson3 and in contract cases as well.4 Why does the Babcock
v. Jackson methodology appeal so strongly to the judges of the
highest state tribunals? The short answer is that this method-
ology is extremely realistic; it brings the judges directly to grips
with the basic elements of the choice problem: two divergent
rules of law producing divergent practical results and ef-
*Moffatt Hancock, Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor of Law, Stanford
University, Stanford, California.
1. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
Canadian courts had reached the same result in a series of analogous cases
beginning 27 years before Babcock v. Jackson. The Canadian courts had
reached this result by manipulating the so-called Phillips v. Eyre formula.
See Hancock, Canadian-American Torts in the Conflict of Laws, 46 Can.
Bar Rev. 226 at pp. 239-244 (1968).
2. An analysis similar to that of Babcock v. Jackson, couched in terms
of statutory construction, was used by the courts of New York and of
other states in a number of nineteenth century cases involving statutory
restraints on testamentary gifts to charity. See Hancock, "In the Parish of
St. Mary le Bow in the Ward of Cheap," 16 Stan. L.Rev. 561, 574-611
(1964). For older English torts cases using a similar technique see
Hancock, Torts Problems in Conflict of Laws Resolved by Statutory
Construction, 18 U. of Tor. L. J. 331 at 341-47 (1968).
3. For a convenient recent list of torts cases and specific subject-
matters see Weintraub, Conflict of Laws 234, Note 36 (1971).
4. See e.g., Intercontinental Planning Ltd. v. Daystrom Inc. 24 N.Y.2d
372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969).
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fectuating divergent policies. Of these two rules the judges must
choose one. The new methodology emancipates them from the
simplistic place of injury formula with its distracting and
misleading escape devices.' It enables them to base their choice
upon a rational consideration of the policies and effects of each
of the proffered rules in relation to the domiciles of the parties
and the location of other significant facts in the case.
What were the divergent rules policies and practical effects
faced by the New York judges in Babcock v. Jackson? In 1935
the legislature of the Province of Ontario enacted the following
statutory provision: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section
1, the owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle
operated in the business of carrying passengers for compensa-
tion, shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting from
bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried in or
upon or entering or getting into or alighting from such motor
vehicle." 6
The effects of this statute in the year 1963 upon Ontario
domestic cases where guest-passengers suffered injury or death
in a motor vehicle can be summarized as follows: First, such
guest-passengers or their surviving dependents were not entitled
to collect one penny from the driver or owner of the motor
vehicle or his insurer. Secondly, the statute had the important
consequence of protecting insurance counsel from the embar-
rassment of having to defend insured defendants who, because
the injured guest-passenger was a relative or close friend, were
perfectly willing to lose the lawsuit. When the statute was first
enacted, a prominent Ontario barrister stated that it was
designed "to prevent the fraudulent assertion of claims by
passengers in collusion with the drivers against insurance
companies."'7 "Fraudulent" and "collusion" are strong words;
5. These devices are discussed in text at notes 10, 11 and 12.
6. Stats. Ontario 1935, c.26, s. 11.
7. John J. Robinette, Survey of Canadian Legislation (Ontario) 1 Univ.
Toronto L.J. 364, 366 (1936). Mr. Robinette was a lecturer in the
Osgoode Hall Law School and held the important position of editor of the
Ontario Reports and the Ontario Weekly Notes. See 11 Canadian Who's
Who 941, 942 (1969).
A similar view of the statute's purpose and practical effect was taken by
Dr. Cecil A. Wright, lecturer in the Osgoode Hall Law School and editor of
the Canadian Bar Review (see 23 Can. Barr Rev. 344, 347) and by
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the overly friendly drivers would have displeased the insurance
counsel had they done nothing worse than admit their own
errors in driving. Whether the claims were "fraudulent" or not,
the insurance counsel understandably disliked defending de-
fendants who preferred to see the plaintiff win.
In the state of New York, on the other hand, the picture
was totally different. Three times had the New York legislature
refused to abrogate or even to limit the liability of owners and
drivers to guest-passengers. 8 They were entitled to recover full
compensation for the driver's ordinary negligence. Insurance
counsel had to defend or settle their claims despite the
unpleasant possibility that the insured defendants were not true
adversary parties.
In the Babcock case, both parties were domiciled in New
York and the defendant was insured. Had the plaintiff
guest-passenger been injured there, she would have been entitled
(like other New Yorkers suffering the same misfortune), to
compensation for her medical expenses, loss of income and
pain. But inasmuch as she had been injured in Ontario, the
defendant's counsel argued that she should get nothing because
a traditional choice-of-law formula required that the law of the
place of injury should determine the defendant's liability.
Under these circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that a
number of judges in the New York Court of Appeals felt
inclined to apply the law of New York. To such a conclusion,
the traditional place of injury formula presented no serious
obstacle. Six prior precedents of the New York Court of
Appeals9 clearly indicated that where both parties were New
York citizens (or carrying on business there), the law of New
York could and probably should be applied rather than that of
the place of injury. True, the reasons for disregarding the law of
the place of injury were not very satisfactorily explained in
these cases; the judges had simply made use of one or more
unconvincing escape devices. However, it is a recognized
Professor A. M. Linden of the Osgoode Law School (see 40 Can. Bar Rev.
284, 285-86 (1962). The marital immunity from tort liability has a very
different historical origin but in practice effectuates the same purpose. See
note 20 Part 5.
8. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482.
9. See notes 10, 11 and 12 infra.
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principle of common-law legal methodology that decisions upon
particular sets of facts may be correct and persuasive even
though the judges have not entirely succeeded in reconciling
them with a traditional legal formula.
What, then, were the escape devices utilized by the judges
in the six prior precedents? Sometimes the issue to be decided
was classified as one of contractual liability to be governed by
the law of the place of contracting (New York).1 0 Sometimes
the issue to be decided was classified as one of remedial law to
be governed by the law of the forum.1 1 And sometimes the
judges simply held that the proffered rule of the place of injury
was contrary to the public policy of New York." z Other
American courts had relied upon the same devices to
circumvent the place of injury formula. 1 3 The notion that the
judges of New York or other states had consistently adhered to
the place of injury formula to achieve uniform and predictable
results is sheerest fantasy. The most that can be said is that it
was frequently reiterated by judges whose superficial research
did not go beyond the black-letter generalizations of the
textbooks. Ingenious judges who read the nonconforming cases
and exploited the escape devices continued to produce a steady
stream of nonconforming opinions.
Any or all of these escape devices could have been
employed in Babcock v. Jackson. 14 Why did the judges not
10. Dyke v. Erie Ry. Co., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871). (Limitation of damages
to $3,000 by statute of state of injury not enforced.) Conklin v.
Canadian-Colonial Airways, 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935)
(Contractual limitation of carrier's liability for wrongful death held invalid
under law of place of contracting, New York; semble valid by law of place
of injury and death, New Jersey. See also Fish v. Delaware etc. Ry. Co.
211 N.Y. 374, 105 N.E. 661 (1914).
11. Wooden v. Western N.Y. and Pa. Ry. Co., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E.
1050 (1891); Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936); Kilberg
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
12. See cases cited in note 11 supra and also Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y.
379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934).
13. For a concise summary of judicial practice, with references to
collections of cases see Leflar, American Conflicts Law 323 (1968).
14. First, the court might have classified the relation of driver to
passenger as contractual or quasi-contractual and so to be governed by the
law of New York where the relation was formed. Second, the court might
have classified the Ontario statute as remedial because it was designed to
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make use of them? Apparently some of the New York judges
were becoming aware of the distracting'" and misleading6
effects of these escape devices and wanted a more comprehen-
sive and realistic analysis. Only two years earlier, the Court of
Appeals had relied upon two of these devices in deciding the
celebrated case of Kilberg v. Northeastern Airlines. 1 Though
the decision aroused considerable criticism, Brainerd Currie, by
making an analysis of the policies and effects of the two
divergent rules involved, persuasively defended the result.1 8 His
analysis was closely similar to that adopted in Babcock v.
Jackson. Ten years earlier Mr. Justice Traynor, speaking for the
Supreme Court of California, had made use of one of the escape
devices in deciding Grant v. McAuliffe. 19 Though that decision
had also excited criticism, Brainerd Currie had defended the
exclude "collusive" litigation from Ontario courts. Third, the court might
simply have held that the Ontario statute was contrary to the public policy
of New York as evinced by its legislature's refusal to enact such a statute.
15. The escape devices are distracting because they tend to focus the
judges' attention upon the abstract issues of classification; should the
Ontario anti-guest statute be classified as a rule of quasi-contractual
liability, or as a rule of tort liability or as a rule barring the guest's remedy
in Ontario courts? But the real basic question before the court was
whether the facts of the present case brought it within the policy range of
the Ontario statute.
For a fuller discussion of the diversionary effect exerted by crude,
over-simplified choice-of-law formulae upon the judicial mind, see
Hancock, The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev.
237 at pp. 246 to 252 (1962).
16. The escape devices are misleading because they are so crudely
comprehensive that they necessarily imply highly undesirable decisions in
cases other than the one before the court. Thus, to hold that the legal
relationship of the host and guest-passenger should be governed by New
York law because it was originally formed there would imply that the New
York rule should be enforced in a case where both parties were domiciled
in Ontario and the injury occurred there so long as the host-guest relation
was formed in New York. To hold that the Ontario anti-guest statute was
procedural or contrary to New York's public policy would imply that it
should be disregarded in all cases litigated in New York courts.
17. See note 11, supra.
18. See B. Currie, Selected Essays on Conflict of Laws (1963) at pp.
690-710. This essay was originally published in [19631 Duke L. J. 1.
19. 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
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result by making an analysis 2 ° similar to that adopted in
Babcock v. Jackson. Four years before the Babcock decision, in
an influential article, Mr. Justice Traynor had eloquently urged
other judges to adopt the analysis so successfully demonstrated
by Currie. In discussing his opinion in Grant v. McAuliffe, he
referred to the place of injury formula with its various escape
devices as "a petrified forest."' '  In Babcock v. Jackson, the
New York Court of Appeals decided to get out of the petrified
forest.
The outstanding characteristic of the methodology
adopted in Babcock v. Jackson was its primary emphasis upon
the policies and practical effects of the divergent domestic rules
involved. It also sought to provide a test to assist judges in
making a choice between the divergent rules.2 2 This test was
20. See B. Currie, Selected Essays in Conflict of Laws (1963) at pp.
128-172. This article originally appeared in 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205 (1958).
The mode of analysis employed in this article was, according to Professor
Currie, derived from and inspired by the opinion of Stone, J. in Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
See Selected Essays at p. 613.
21. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 Texas L. Rev. 657,
670 note 35 (1959).
22. See 12 N.Y.2d 473 at p. 481. "Justice, fairness and the best
practical result ... may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the
law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship with the
occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue
raised in the litigation. The merit of such a rule is that it gives to the place
having the most interest in the problem paramount control over the legal
issues arising out of a particular factual context .. " (Italics added.)
In the light of the foregoing test the strongest argument for choosing
the compensatory rule of New York was that the plaintiff was domiciled
there and, since the defendant was not domiciled in Ontario and the suit
was not brought there, neither policy of the Ontario statute called for its
application. Unfortunately, in his eagerness to justify an apparently novel
mode of analysis, Judge Fuld stressed several factual contacts with New
York that add little or nothing to the strength of any policy directed
argument for choosing the New York rule, namely: that the car was
garaged, licensed and insured in New York, that the host-guest relationship
was formed in New York and that the trip began and was to end there.
Reliance upon these insignificant contacts lead to the confusing and now
discredited opinion in Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792
(1965). It was severely criticized in the concurring opinion of Keating J. in
Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380 (1966) and explicitly
overruled in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 294 (1969).
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easily applied in the Babcock case because the facts obviously
fell within the policy-determined range of the New York
compensatory rule and outside that of the Ontario statute
giving immunity to negligent host-drivers.
In one of the most realistic passages of his opinion, Judge
Fuld considers the significance of automobile liability insurance
for a policy-determined choice analysis, a prickly problem that
judges have often preferred to ignore. In demonstrating that the
policies of the Ontario statute did not extend to the facts of the
Babcock case, he relied upon the statement discussed above that
the object of the statute was "to prevent the fraudulent
assertion of claims by passengers, in collusion with the drivers,
against insurance companies." '2 3 As has been noted, this
statement unduly confines the aversion felt by insurance
counsel to defending guest-passenger claims. Whether the claims
are fraudulent or not, insurance counsel fear the possibility that
the host-driver may not sufficiently insist upon his own
innocence of negligence. Assuming the statute was intended to
relieve Ontario insurance counsel from defending such claims,
that policy had become completely irrelevant when the suit was
brought in New York where it would be defended by New York
counsel.
In practice, of course, the Ontario statute benefited not
only insurance counsel but insurance companies as well since it
eliminated the necessity to litigate or settle a large number of
claims. Conceivably, Mr. Jackson's insurer might have been
carrying on an extensive business in Ontario. But it would have
been most inappropriate for its counsel to argue that as a
member of the Ontario economic community it was entitled to
the protection of Ontario law. For it had bound itself by a
solemn contract to pay the damages if Mr. Jackson was liable.
Whether the law of Ontario, or any other jurisdiction where it
operated, purported to protect it against guest claims was quite
beside the point.2 4 Indeed it is highly unlikely that any
responsible insurance counsel would actually advance such an
argument.
23. See 12 N.Y.2d 473 at 482-83.
24. In short, a fully articulated analysis of all relevant domestic policies
would have to recognize Ontario's interest in protecting the insurer from
liability if it were carrying on a substantial amount of business in Ontario.
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Though the court demonstrated convincingly that its
decision did not conflict in any way with the policies of the
Ontario anti-guest statute, it might have gone further and
demonstrated that its decision actually advanced certain other
policies of Ontario law. For the anti-guest statute was not the
only element of Ontario law involved in the decision of this
case. Ontario had a general policy of compensating persons
injured on its highways; its comparative negligence statute
2 1
actually enabled them to recover damages even when their own
negligence had been a contributing cause of their injury.
Moreover, the imposition of civil liability was designed to deter
careless drivers from violating Ontario's admonitory rules
governing the operation of motor vehicles. In a purely domestic
case involving an injured guest-passenger, these policies would,
of course, have been subverted in favor of the anti-guest
statute's policies of protecting kind-hearted hosts and their
insurance counsel. Since these policies had no application to a
case involving a New York host and his New York insurance
counsel, the decision in Babcock v. Jackson actually advanced
the Ontario compensatiory and deterrent policies without
subverting those of the anti-guest statute. In addition, the
decision had the effect of providing a fund for the payment of
Ontario doctors and nurses who had provided emergency
treatment for Miss Babcock.2 6
That several significant policies of Ontario law were
effectuated by the award of damages to the plaintiff was not of
great importance in the Babcock case. But in a case where the
facts were different, these policies might be the only significant
ones requiring recognition. Suppose that a gentleman domiciled
in New York had, while vacationing in Ontario, met an
But because of the insurer's contract the court could give effect to this
policy only by exonerating the defendant from liability. The notion that a
court should exonerate the defendant from liability to implement an
Ontario policy of protecting his insurer would surely strike most judges as
bizarre and grossly unfair to the plaintiff.
25. See the Negligence Act, R.S.O. 1970 c. 296. For brief history and
commentary see Linden, Report of the Osgoode Hall Study on
Compensation for Victims of Automobile Accidents (1965) ch. 4, p. 7.
26. This point is made by Keating, J. (concurring) in the subsequent
and similar case of Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380
(1966). See 18 N.Y.2d 289 at p. 295.
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attractive lady domiciled there and offered her a ride in his car.
When he carelessly drove off the road and hit a tree, she was
severely injured. How should a New York court apply the
Babcock v. Jackson methodology to such a case? New York's
policy of compensating injured guests certainly has no obvious
application to this lady domiciled and injured in Ontario. On
the other hand, Ontario's policy of protecting kind-hearted
hosts and their insurance counsel has no obvious application to
a suit in a New York court against a New York host. A decision
for the plaintiff will, however, clearly advance Ontario's interest
in deterring careless driving on its highways, in compensating
persons injured there and in securing the payment of
therapeutic creditors who had come to their aid. Though other
theories may be suggested to support a judgment for the
plaintiff, 2 7 the interests most obviously advanced thereby
would be those of Ontario.
The necessity imposed by the Babcock v. Jackson
methodology for giving careful consideration to the laws and
policies of the concerned states had made the judges acutely
aware of a type of problem that may be stated abstractly as
follows: what should a court committed to a policy-determined
analysis of choice cases do when it appears that, though the
factual contacts of a case bring it within the policy range of a
rule of the forum, they also bring it within the policy range of a
divergent rule of another state? It is the principal purpose of
this article to discuss the recent marital immunity and anti-guest
statute cases involving this problem and to consider some
techniques for reconciling the ostensibly conflicting rules that
have been suggested by commentators and adopted by courts in
those cases.
2. Kell v. Henderson and analogous Wisconsin cases.
In the much discussed case of Kell v. Henderson,2 8 the New
York Appellate Division decided an ostensible true conflict case
27. E.g., that New York's compensatory rule is the "better law." (See
text at note 39 infra.) The decision of a New York trial judge in Neumeier
v. Kuebner, 313 N.Y.S.2d 468, 63 Misc.2d 66 (1970) is contrary to the
analysis advanced in the text.
28. 47 Misc.2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1965) affirmed, 26
App.Div.2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dep't 1966). The Appellate
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in which the facts were precisely the reverse of Babcock v.
Jackson. Though the decision was influenced by procedural
considerations and the choice problem barely noticed, the case
deserves careful analysis because a number of valuable
commentaries have taken it for their theme.2 9 Stephanie Kell, a
minor, accepted Albert Henderson's invitation to go for a ride
in a car owned by his mother, Helen Henderson. All three were
domiciled in Ontario but the trip took the young couple into
New York where Stephanie was seriously injured when the
automobile left the highway and struck a bridge. Suit for
damages having been brought in New York against the driver
and owner, they moved at a late stage of the proceedings for
leave to set up a defence based upon the Ontario anti-guest
statute. The judge of first instance refused such leave and his
decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division.
In order to fully develop the issues involved, let us assume
that Mrs. Henderson, the automobile owner was insured, that
the driver was guilty of ordinary negligence under New York
law and that the New York court took judicial notice, not only
of the Ontario anti-guest statute but of the Ontario domestic
cases determining its application to marginal sets of facts.
What arguments might have been advanced for the
application of the New York law? First, that New York's policy
of compensating injured guest passengers should not be limited
to New York domiciliaries but should extend to persons
temporarily resident there and to transients such as Stephanie
Kell. Second, that in allowing the car to leave the road and
strike a bridge, the defendant driver had violated New York's
admonitory rules governing the operation of motor vehicles on
its highways and should therefore be subjected to civil liability.
It is beside the point to urge that concern for their own safety,
or the threat of criminal prosecution should have been a
Division has more recently taken an exactly contrary view in Orbutbnot v.
Allbrigbt, 35 App. Div.2d 315, 316 N.Y.2d 391 (3d Dep't 1970)
apparently relying upon dictum in the concurring opinion of Fuld, J. in
Tooker v. Lopez cited note 22 supra.
29. See Trautman, Kell v. Henderson; A Comment, 67 Colum. L. Rev.
468 (1967); Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, id at 459;
Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Cboice Influencing Considerations 54
Calif. L. Rev. 1584 at p. 1593; Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for
Progress, 46 Texas L. Rev. 141 at 170 (1967).
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sufficient deterrent to careless drivers. The question is not what
one may think should have been a sufficient deterrent but what
New York law has prescribed. Thirdly, since the payment of
medical expenses was one of the principal items of the
compensation that New York law would have awarded, New
York had a concern that such an award should be made to
ensure that the New York doctors and hospitals were paid for
their necessary and costly services. In short, the enforcement of
the New York rule requiring the compensation of injured
guest-passengers would have advanced a number of important
New York policies.
How did the Ontario anti-guest statute relate to the
present case? That statute had, as has been noted, two policies.
Its policy of protecting Ontario insurance counsel from the
potential hazards of collusive litigation was, of course, quite
irrelevant to a case being litigated in New York.3 0 But its
second policy of shielding owners and drivers from all liability
to their injured guest-passengers clearly extended to Mrs.
Henderson because she was domiciled in Ontario. This
contention on behalf of Mrs. Henderson is not affected by the
assumed fact that she carried insurance. For even though she
did carry insurance, the anti-guest statute protected her against
the anxiety of being involved in a lawsuit (an experience most
people dislike intensely), and the terrifying possibility that if a
large judgment were entered against her, it might exceed the
limits of the insurance coverage. Likewise, the statute protected
her against the possibility that if judgment were to go against
her, she might have to pay a higher premium for insurance in
the future.
Thus the court was faced with a conflict between the
policies of the divergent Ontario and New York rules. How
should this conflict have been resolved? The court might have
resolved it very simply by holding that since New York had a
30. As pointed out in note 24 supra, a complete analysis of Ontario
policies would involve the recognition that one effect of the anti-guest
statute was to protect insurers carrying on business in Ontario from the
hazards of defending defendants who do not want to win. But since the
insurer has by its contract agreed to be liable if the insured is liable, a New
York judge would probably give scant consideration to Ontario's policy of
protecting insurers as against New York's interest in allowing recovery.
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substantial interest in the application of its law, a New York
court ought to effectuate that interest. Indeed, there could be
situations in which a New York court would have no other
alternative. 3 1 But judges who have adopted the Babcock v.
Jackson methodology have frequently exhibited reluctance to
decide choice cases upon this ground alone. They have turned
increasingly to the writings of certain commentators who have
suggested several techniques for reconciling ostensible policy
conflicts.
In the Kell case, a very comprehensive and persuasive
argument, suggested by Trautman, 3 2 might have been made for
giving a restrained construction to the Ontario statute and
virtually eliminating the conflict. It is based upon a considera-
tion of the Ontario domestic borderline cases construing the
statute. In these cases the Ontario courts had to consider
whether the statutory policy of conferring complete immunity
upon owners and drivers for injury to their guest-passengers
should prevail against the other policies of Ontario law requiring
the compensation of injured persons. A careful study of these
cases previously made by a Canadian legal scholar showed that
Ontario judges had uniformly given the statute an extremely
restricted construction. He had found that the courts had
engaged in "a battle to eclipse"3 3 the statute. The Kell case was
31. E.g., a situation in which the legislative history of a statute
indicated a strong commitment of the legislature to a particular policy.
Perhaps this was the situation in Kell v. Henderson; see the remarks of
Keating, J. in Macey v. Rozbicki (supra note 26) concerning the
compensation of persons injured in highway traffic accidents, 18 N.Y.2d
289 at 293.
32. See op. cit. note 29. The present author does not agree with
Professor Trautman's suggestion that the statute does not have any policy
to protect insurers or their counsel against collusion. Trautman also relies
strongly upon the circumstances that in 1966 the Ontario legislature
amended the statute by permitting a guest-passenger to recover for "gross
negligence."
33. See Linden, Comment, 40 Can. Bar Rev. 284 (1962). At p. 292 he
summarizes the judicial treatment of the statute thus: "Although the
gratuitous passenger subsection has survived in Ontario without legislative
amendment for twenty-seven years, it has not avoided judicial amendment.
The courts have fought against the subsection and some success has been
achieved. Various devices have been invented from time to time in order to
mollify the full rigour of the subsection. Vicarious liability, the
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analogous to these Ontario domestic cases in that the New York
court had to decide whether the immunity-granting policy of
the Ontario statute should prevail against several contrary
policies of New York law requiring the compensation of
Stephanie Kell. In the light of the Ontario decisions consistently
restricting the scope of the statute in favor of domestic
compensatory policies, the New York court would have been
fully justified in giving it a restricted construction in favor of
the several compensatory policies of New York law. 
3 4
Nothing has been said in the foregoing analysis concerning
the impact of the Kell case and others like it upon the liability
insurance rates charged to persons domiciled in Ontario. This
matter the New York court should have ignored completely for
two reasons. First, the New York court had no grounds
whatever for thinking that one of the policies of the Ontario
guest statute was the diminution of insurance rates. Indeed, the
Ontario domestic decisions consistently restricting the opera-
tion of the statute constituted a strong indication that no such
policy existed. Second, though the Kell case and others like it
would have provided a tiny portion of the data used in the
complex process of fixing rates for the various rating territories
in Ontario, the only positive statement that could have been
made about its impact is that it would either be very slight or
possibly totally insignificant.3"
relationship of master and servant existing between the parties, the broad
construction of 'the exception within the exception' ["a vehicle operated
in the business of carrying passengers for compensation"] perhaps a shift
in the onus of proof to the defendant, an express contract of carriage and
now a contract of safe carriage as part of a contract of employment have
all been used. These examples alone are evidence that subsection (2) of
section 105 of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act is out of step with current
Canadian policy and thought." In 1966 the subsection was amended to
permit recovery for "gross negligence." See now R.S.O. 1970 c. 202 s.
132(3).
34. If in the case discussed in the text, the suit had been brought in
Ontario the court would probably follow the rules derived from Phillips v.
Eyre (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 at 28-29 which prohibit the enforcement of a
cause of action not recognized by the domestic law of the forum. See
Gagnon v. Lecavalier [1967] 2 O.R. 197, the decision of single judge
dismissing a guest-passenger's action for damages sustained in Quebec
whose law would have permitted recovery.
35. See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process: The
Insignificance of Foresigbt 554 at 574-76.
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The foregoing theoretical analysis of Kell v. Henderson
embodies the views of the author and other commentators as to
how a court pursuing a policy-determined analysis might have
decided this particular ostensible true conflict case. In Heath v.
Zellmer,3 6 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin (having already
adopted the Babcock v. Jackson methodology), 3 delivered a
very articulate and comprehensive opinion in a case involving
the same pattern of facts and laws as Kell v. Henderson, with
one highly significant additional fact. Two guest-passengers,
domiciled in Indiana (which has one of the harsher types of
anti-guest statute), were injured in a collision in Wisconsin
(which has none). The car in which they rode was owned by an
insured Indiana domiciliary and driven by his daughter with his
permission; the other car was owned and driven by an insured
Wisconsin domiciliary. The guest-passengers brought suit against
the Wisconsin owner-driver and his insurer; in this suit, involving
no question of guest liability, the Wisconsin owner-driver was
obviously liable for ordinary negligence. He and his insurer then
took proceedings to implead the driver (and insurer) of the
Indiana car on the ground that she, having been guilty of
ordinary negligence in the collision, was liable for contribution
to pay any judgment obtained by the guest-passengers. These
proceedings raised the choice of law issue: were the driver and
insurer of the Indiana car liable to the Indiana guest-passengers
for ordinary negligence under Wisconsin law or were they
entitled to the protective immunity of the Indiana anti-guest
statute?
To support the application of Wisconsin law, the court
marshalled the three policy arguments itemized above to
support the application of the law of the state of injury (New
York) in Kell v. Henderson. In addition, the court emphasized a
fourth Wisconsin policy, that of holding the drivers of the
Wisconsin and Indiana cars to the same standard of ordinary
negligence and so "spreading losses and assessing damages
against all tortfeasors in proportion to their causal negligence."
If Indiana law were allowed to give the driver of the Indiana car
complete immunity, the entire burden of the damages suffered
by the Indiana passengers would be thrown on the Wisconsin
36. 35 Wis.2d 578; 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
37. In Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 2d 617; 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
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driver "with no opportunity to seek contribution from their
negligent host ... even though it might be her negligence that
was the principal cause of the accident." 1
3 8
The court recognized the two-fold purpose of the Indiana
anti-guest statute: to protect host drivers from liability in a
situation where they had generously offered the guest a free
ride and to prevent collusion in guest's suits against friendly
insured hosts. The court noted that the latter policy was
irrelevant to the instant case since it was not being litigated in
an Indiana court. But the first policy clearly extended to the
instant case and would have been frustrated if Wisconsin law
were applied. How then should the conflict be resolved?
In Kell v. Henderson, the conflict between the New York
law and the Ontario anti-guest statute could have been virtually
eliminated because a prior study of the Ontario domestic cases
had shown that Ontario judges had consistently restricted the
operation of that statute. No such study of the Indiana
domestic cases was available in Heath v. Zellmer. What was
available was a pointed commentary on anti-guest statutes by an
eminent conflicts scholar. Relying on earlier studies he had
concluded that they were anachronistic and had, in recent
years, been less rigorously applied and more severely criticized.
"Current feeling is that they are both unfair to guests and
contrary to the enterprise liability, spread-the-loss concept that
prevails in the automobile tort area today."' 3 9 In discussing an
hypothetical case on all fours with Kell v. Henderson, he had
suggested that the court of the state where the injury occurred
should apply its law to grant recoverly because the foregoing
considerations showed it to be "the better rule of law." The
Wisconsin judges adopted this method for resolving the conflict
with Indiana law, stating that their domestic rule was "a
superior and better standard from a socioeconomic viewpoint,
more consonant with present day thinking than the outmoded
'Model T' guest statute .. ."40 The court also emphasized its
duty to advance the governmental interests of Wisconsin that
would have been defeated by the application of the Indiana
statute.
38. 35 Wis. 2d 578 at 601.
39. Leflar, op. cit. note 29: 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1584 at 1595.
40. 35 Wis. 2d 578 at 604.
120 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Why were the Wisconsin judges not content to rest their
decision on the ground that several important Wisconsin policies
required the application of its rule? The first and most obvious
reason has already been discussed: use of the Babcock v.
Jackson methodology has made judges so sensitive to the
policies and concerns of other states that they are reluctant to
reject them on the single and rigid ground that the court must
prefer the policies of its own state. The suggestion that they
should decide which was the better law strongly appealed to
these judges because it enabled them to make an impartial,
independent choice between the divergent rules of the forum
and the other concerned state. That the policies of the forum
have a primary claim upon its judges was not denied but neither
was that primary claim allowed to exclude all other choice-
influencing considerations.
A second explantion for the court's use of the better law
argument may be found in the circumstance that the statute
books of every state contain certain provisions that (like the
anti-guest statutes) embody old-fashioned, out-moded views of
social policy. Given a choice, in an ostensible true conflict case,
between one of these anachronistic provisions from the
statute-book of the forum and a more rational, modern rule of
another state, some judges might seize the opportunity to
recognize the anachronistic nature of the forum's provision and
to enforce the more rational rule of the other state. The
adoption of the better law approach in the Heath case opened
the door to the possibility of using it under such circum-
stances.
4 1
Conklin v. Horner,4 2 decided nine months later by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, involved a guest passenger injured in
a one-car accident in Wisconsin, without the additional
41. The explicit use of the "better law" technique was effectively
explained and justified by Leflar in two influential articles: Cboice-
Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 267 (1966)
and op. cit. note 29. As these titles indicate, choice of the better law was
one of five choice-influencing considerations affecting the decision of
conflicts cases. Another relatively specific consideration was the advance-
ment of the forurm's governmental interests. The remaining three were
more abstract and diffuse: (1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of
interstate and international order; (3) simplification of the judicial task.
42. 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
Torts in Conflicts of Laws 121
complication of two defendants. The host-driver and guest-
passenger were both domiciled in Illinois whose anti-guest
statute denied recovery to guests except for "wilful and wanton
misconduct of the driver."'4 3 The defendant was insured. A
majority of the court held that the Wisconsin standard of
ordinary negligence should be applied. In support of this
holding, the court marshalled the same three arguments used in
Heath v. Zellmer and itemized in the discussion of Kell v.
Henderson. It was unable to rely upon the fourth argument
used in Heath v. Zellmer, emphasizing the injustice of throwing
the entire burden of the guest-passengers' damages upon the
Wisconsin domiciled driver of the second car. If the Wisconsin
rule had not been applied, the entire loss would have been
borne by the injured Illinois guest-passenger.
As in Heath v. Zellmer, the court noted that although one
policy objective of the Illinois anti-guest statute was irrelevant,
the statute still conflicted, to some extent, with Wisconsin's law
and policy. To resolve this conflict, the court chiefly relied
upon the same pair of arguments used in the Heath case. "The
use of Wisconsin law will significantly advance the interests of
the forum while its non-application would be detrimental to
Wisconsin policy; and in addition, we select Wisconsin's law as
the better law and reject that of Illinois as a creed outworn. 
4 4
The court rested its decision to reject the Illinois anti-guest
statute upon a third ground not considered in Heath v. Zellmer.
Relying upon a commentarial survey of a line of Illinois cases,
the court observed that in construing the words "wilful and
wanton misconduct", the Illinois courts had consistently
narrowed the operation of the anti-guest statute. Hence the
court concluded that the conflict between the statute and the
Wisconsin rule was not as great as a literal reading of the statute
would indicate.
43. Illinois Rev. S. c. 95 , s. 9-201.
44. 38 Wis.2d 468 at 485.
45. 38 Wis.2d 468 at 480. The commentarial survey was in 54 Nw U.
L. Rev. 263 (1959).
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3. The Cipolla and Schneider cases
In the much discussed case of Cipolla v. Sbaposka,1 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (which had previously adopted
the Babcock v. Jackson methodology), encountered a true
conflict problem arising from a pattern of facts and laws
different from those we have discussed. Delaware had an
anti-guest statute permitting recovery by a guest-passenger only
for "intentional or wilful or wanton misconduct";2 Pennsyl-
vania had none. The plaintiff, domiciled in Pennsylvania, was
injured in Delaware by the ordinary negligence of his host-driver
who was domiciled in Delaware. The defendant was insured.
The argument for applying the Pennsylvania rule was clear
and strong; the plaintiff called upon the courts of his home
state to apply its compensatory rule for his benefit. The
position of Delaware law was more complex. So far as the
Delaware statute effectuated a policy of protecting insurance
counsel against the hazards of collision, it was totally irrelevant
to litigation in Pennsylvania. But so far as it was designed to
protect Delaware host-drivers from liability to guests, (involving
embarrassment and risk) it was directly relevant and deserved
consideration.
What was the significance for Delaware law and policy of
the fact that the injury occurred in that state? At first sight, the
answer would seem to be: "absolutely none." The Delaware
anti-guest statute had two policies, neither of which was
specifically directed to collisions occurring in Delaware. The
statutory policy of protecting Delaware citizens from liability
would have been applicable to any collisions involving them as
defendants, in Delaware or elsewhere. The policy of protecting
insurance counsel from the hazards of collision was directed
exclusively to litigation in Delaware courts. Nevertheless, closer
analysis reveals certain other policies of Delaware law coming
into play because the injury occurred there. Apart from its
anti-guest statute, Delaware, like any state concerned with the
enormous cost of traffic injuries, had three general policies. It
had a policy of compensating persons injured on its highways; it
had a policy of deterring careless drivers by imposing civil
liability and it had a policy of ensuring the payment of
1. 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
2. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 21, sec. 6101(a).
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therapeutic creditors for their costly and essential services. Had
both parties been domiciled in Pennsylvania, an award of
damages to the plaintiff would have advanced all three of these
policies without subverting in the least the policies of the
anti-guest statutes. 3 In the instant case, an award of damages
would have subverted one of the policies of the anti-guest
statute (protection of Delaware host-drivers), but it would also
have advanced Delaware's three other policies and Pennsylva-
nia's compensatory policy as well. Alternatively, a denial of
recovery would have advanced one of the anti-guest statute
policies (protection of Delaware host-drivers), but subverted the
other three Delaware policies as well as that of Pennsylvania.
In a brilliant dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Roberts urged
the court to adopt the former alternative because a recent
Delaware choice-of-law decision showed that "Delaware itself
limits the scope of its policy and the protection it will give to its
resident hosts." 4  In Friday v. Smoot,' a Delaware guest-
passenger sued his Delaware host-driver for injuries sustained
while they were driving in New Jersey, a state that has no
anti-guest statute. The plaintiff relied upon the traditional place
of injury formula; the defendant urged the court to adopt the
Babcock v. Jackson methodology which would have brought
both policies of the anti-guest statute into play in a case where
both parties were Delaware citizens. But the Delaware court
obviously had no desire whatever to apply its anti-guest statute.
It rejected the Babcock v. Jackson methodology with the
time-worn clich6 that it might cause difficulty in other cases
where the facts were different and followed the law of New
Jersey. Had the Delaware judges been influenced solely by
judicial conservatism, they could still have clung to the
traditional system but used one of the system's escape devices
to justify the application of the Delaware statute. 6 Their basic
3. See text at note 26 supra. (parts 1 and 2) This point is made very
cogently in Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Maine, 1970), a case on
all fours with the case supposed in the text.
4. See 439 Pa. 563 at 576.
5. 211 A.2d 594(1965).
6. E.g. they could have classified the Delaware anti-guest statute as a
remedial rule, designed to limit the scope of the guest-passenger's remedy
in Delaware courts. Or they could have classified it as a rule to regulated
host-guest relationship established in Delaware between Delaware citizens.
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motive seems clearly to have been a desire to restrict that
statute's operation in interstate cases.
Mr. Justice Roberts also urged the court to resolve the
ostensible conflict between Pennsylvania and Delaware policies
by choosing the better law. To demonstrate that anti-guest
statutes were anachronistic and regressive, he relied upon the
criticisms of commentators and recent decisions of courts in
states which had adopted them "construing them much more
narrowly, evidencing their dissatisfaction with them." 7
Unfortunately, the majority of the court ignored Mr.
Justice Roberts' valuable suggestions for resolving the ostensible
conflict of policies and made the extraordinary concession of
enforcing the Delaware anti-guest statute. The principal ground
of their opinion was a novel doctrine which they stated as
follows: "It seems only fair to permit a defendant to rely on his
home state law when he is acting within that state. ...
Inhabitants of a state should not be put in jeopardy of liability
exceeding that created by their state's law just because a visitor
from a state offering higher protection decides to visit there." 8
The most obvious flaw in this argument is that it grossly
distorts the significance of the fact that the plaintiff was injured
in Delaware. The Delaware statute, as has been noted, had two
policies neither of which was directed to injuries occurring in
Delaware. Three other policies of Delaware law would actually
have been advanced by an award of damages to the plaintiff.
Yet the majority tried to pretend that the location of the injury
in Delaware brought the policies of the guest statute into play
and so justified the denial of recovery to the plaintiff. The
second flaw in the majority's novel doctrine is that it abruptly
rejects, without discussion, both the techniques for resolving
policy conflicts in choice cases propounded by commentators,
adopted by other courts, and carefully explained by the
dissenting judge. Wasn't it important and relevant for the court
to consider the restrictive construction put on the Delaware
statute by the Delaware court in Friday v. Smoot? Wasn't it
important and relevant for the court to consider that
commentators had shown anti-guest statutes to be anachronistic
and that judges in states where they prevailed had construed
7. 439 Pa. 563 at 577.
8. 439 Pa. 563 at 567.
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them narrowly in domestic cases? The majority's answer to
both these questions was apparently in the negative.
Prior to the decision of Cipolla v. Sbaposka, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota reached the opposite result in the almost
identical case of Schneider v. Nichols. ' North Dakota had an
anti-guest statute requiring proof of "gross negligence";
Minnesota had none. The injured plaintiff guest was domiciled
in Minnesota; the defendant driver was domiciled in North
Dakota where the accident occurred. Having declined to apply
the North Dakota anti-guest statute in a prior case exactly like
Babcock v. Jackson, 1 0 the court held, in a unanimous opinion,
that the facts distinguishing the present case from the earlier
case did not justify the application of the North Dakota statute.
They relied heavily upon Leflar's better law analysis of guest
statutes as stated by Chief Justice Kenison in Clarke v.
Clarke: II "Courts of states which did adopt them are today
construing them much more narrowly evidencing their dis-
satisfaction with them ... though still on the books they
contradict the spirit of the times ... Unless other considera-
tions demand it we should not go out of our way to enforce
such a law of another state as against the better law of our own
state."' 2
Unfortunately, the court could not resist the temptation
to bolster its reasoning by putting unnecessary and misleading
emphasis on trivial and insignificant factual contacts with
Minnesota. These trivial contacts were: (1) that the defendant
driver, having changed his domicile from Minnesota to North
Dakota about six months before the accident, was operating his
car with Minnesota license plates and carrying a Minnesota
driver's license: (2) that the trip began in Minnesota and would
have ended there but for the injury which occurred only a few
miles from the Minnesota boundary. No thoughtful student of
judicial behavior seriously supposes that in a subsequent case
where these trivial factors were not present the Minnesota
judges would apply the anachronistic North Dakota statute to
9. 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968).
10. Kopp v. Recbtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966).
11. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
12. 280 Minn. 139 at 146. The quoted passage appears in 107 N.H.
351 at 357.
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the prejudice of a Minnesota citizen. The court was very
blatantly making use of an unconvincing and much criticized
device for resolving ostensible true conflict cases: the device of
contact collecting. By appearing to rely in part upon these
trivial contacts, the court spoiled an otherwise enlightening
opinion and greatly weakened its usefulness as a precedential
guide. ' 3
4. Techniques of Reconciliation Used in the Anti-Guest Statute
Cases: A Summary.
Despite some appearances to the contrary, the Babcock v.
Jackson methodology is not a product of judicial parochialism
designed to enable courts to justify resort to the law of the
forum. On the contrary, it has made most judges who use it
very sensitive to the interests of other states as expressed in the
policies of their laws. Recognizing this judicial concern, modern
commentators have suggested several techniques of reconcilia-
tion to assist the judges in deciding which of the ostensibly
conflicting rules of law they should enforce. In commenting on
Babcock v. Jackson, Brainerd Currie volunteered a series of
general propositions for the purpose of finding a rule of
decision which included the following:
"3. If the court finds an apparent conflict between the
interests of the two states it should reconsider. A more
moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or interest
of one state or the other may avoid conflict."' I
In his penetrating analysis of Kell v. Henderson,
Trautman advanced a persuasive argument for the New York
court giving a restrained interpretation to the only relevant
policy of the Ontario anti-guest statute that may be generalized
as follows: If a certain statutory or non-statutory rule has
consistently been given a restrained construction in domestic
cases decided by the courts of the state where it prevails, a
foreign court whose local rule and policy conflict with that rule
13. In Cipolla v. Shaposka, the majority treated the Schneider case as
turning chiefly upon the first of the trivial contacts noted above, and so
proceeded to ignore the similarities of the two cases.
14. Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1212 at
1242.
15. Op. cit. n. 29 supra. (parts 1 and 2)
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in a choice case may properly give that rule a restrained
construction. In Conklin v. Horner, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court was able to make a limited use of this technique of
reconciliation as one of its grounds for disregarding the Illinois
anti-guest statute. And in Cipolla v. Sbaposka, Mr. Justice
Roberts (dissenting) extended this technique by using a
Delaware choice-of-law case to demonstrate that Delaware
judges did not want to see their anti-guest statute applied to an
interstate case even though both parties were citizens of
Delaware and both policies of the statute were involved.
In the same analysis of Kell v. Henderson, Trautman
described another technique of reconciliation that has the
support of two well-known older choice cases.' 6 Suppose that
in a case such as Kell v. Henderson (or the analogous Wisconsin
cases), the state of the parties common domicile had repealed
its anti-guest statute shortly after the injury occurred and
before judgment had been rendered. This circumstance provides
the strongest possible evidence that at the time when the injury
occurred, the policies of the anti-guest statute were not held in
high regard by the lawmaking authorities of the state where it
prevailed. Though it was at that time technically in force, a
consensus of disapproval and criticism must have been growing
up which eventually provoked the legislature to change the law.
On the basis of this evidence, the courts of either state would be
justified in giving the statute a restrained construction as
applied to the ostensible true conflict case supposed or, indeed,
in any true conflict case involving the anti-guest statute. This
construction does not, of course, give retroactive effect to the
repealing statute. The repealing statute is simply used as
evidence to show that at the time of injury, the policies of the
anti-guest statute were not regarded as policies of special
importance in the state where the statute was in force. The
16. Millikin v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878); Dammert v. Osborn, 140
N.Y.30, 35 N.E. 407 (1893) rehearing denied. 141 N.Y. 564, 35 N.E.
1088 (1894). In each of these cases the court was urged to enforce a
statute of the forum, in an ostensible true conflict case, on the ground that
the statute in question represented the public policy of the forum as
declared by its legislature. In each case the court declined to do so for
various reasons. One important reason was that the statute in question had
been repealed after the facts had occurred.
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repealing statute is used just as domestic cases might be used to
justify a restrained construction of the anti-guest statute.
Of all the techniques for resolving ostensible true conflict
cases, the most widely adopted has been Leflar's better law
analysis. One obvious reason for this is its broad availability as
compared with other techniques; it is not necessary to find in
the law reports of the anti-guest statute state domestic or choice
cases restricting the statute's operation. Prior to the appearance
of Leflar's influential articles7 certain commentators had
voiced the abstract criticism that the better law analysis
(sometimes called the result-selective approach), would make
the decision of choice cases too subjective, too dependent upon
the judges' personal preference for one state's policy over
another.' 8 Whatever the merits of this abstract criticism may
be, as applied to the anti-guest statute cases, it clearly misses the
target. It is an objective fact that these statutes are anachronis-
tic because they were enacted at a time when many drivers were
not insured and the prevailing sentiment that insurance ought to
be available to pay the claims of all innocent victims of highway
traffic accidents did not exist. It is an objective fact that some
courts have silently protested against the injustice of these
statutes by construing them as narrowly as possible."9 Like the
policy-determined state interest analysis that has brought it into
favor as a technique of reconciliation, the better law analysis
represents a trend toward greater realism in the decision of
choice cases. There is no reason why judges should always
indulge the polite fiction that one state's law is just as fair and
well-adjusted to modern conditions as that of another. Where
the domicile of one party or other facts of a case bring it within
the policy range of the court's local rule, the better law analysis
enables the judges to justify the choice of that rule without
committing themselves to the rigid principle that in such cases
the law of the forum must always prevail.
17. Op. cit. n. 41 supra (parts 1 and 2).
18. See e.g., Currie, Selected Essays in Conflict of Laws (1963) at 153.
19. For the Ontario cases see note 33 supra (parts 1 and 2). For similar
treatment of anti-guest statutes in other jurisdictions see 33 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 374 at 392 (1961); Judicial Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 884 (1968).
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5. The Marital Immunity; Introduction
In some states that have no anti-guest statutes (such as
Wisconsin, Kentucky and New Hampshire), a wife or husband
whose spouse's negligent driving has caused their injury in a
one-car accident is entitled, like a guest passenger, to recover
full compensation from the negligent spouse. Of course, such
interspousal suits are only brought when the negligent spouse is
insured. The insurer and the injured spouse are the real
adversaries. The husband and wife go to court hand in hand,
ready to brave the embarrassments of examination and
cross-examination and to take the risk of increased future
premiums because they want to recover compensation for the
injured spouse's medical care and lost income. Insurance
counsel naturally dislike defending and settling these suits but
where they are permitted, counsel must bear the burden and do
the best they can.' 0
On the other hand, there a number of states where the
ancient common law marital immunity still remains in force
with respect to personal torts. The persistence of this ancient
doctrine as a bar to the compensation of highway traffic victims
in the twentieth century requires a brief historical explanation.
During the nineteenth century, state legislatures enacted
statutes designed to emancipate married women from the
overwhelming managerial powers conferred upon husbands by
the eighteenth century common law. Speaking generally, these
statutes empowered married women to acquire and dispose of
real and personal property, inter vivos and by will, as if they
were single. Moreover, they included litigation sections provid-
ing (in varying terms) that married women might sue and be
sued in their own names as if they were single. Relying upon
these litigation sections, married women who had become
divorced or separated from their husbands brought suit against
them for assaults, batteries or other personal torts committed
before the divorce or separation.
20. See Cook, Wbat Law Governs Intrafamily Immunity? 27 Ins.
Counsel J. 143 (1960) at 144. "Such a suit, moreover, carries a clear
message to the jury that the defendant is insured. Thus such a law suit
becomes in reality a travesty on the court. It is not a genuine adversary
proceeding between the adversaries of record. .. . The anomaly is further
intensified by the aspect of the defence attorney's loyalty being directly
contra to the interests of the defendant of record .... "
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Prior to the year 1914,21 it was the unanimous view of the
courts that these litigation sections should be narrowly
construed so as to leave the common law marital immunity in
full force with respect to personal torts. The common clich6 of
these elderly opinions was that such suits, if permitted, would
generate domestic discord and disrupt the harmony of the
home. Strange as these words may sound in modern ears, it is
not very difficult to recapture the thoughts of the judges of that
day and generation who wrote them. They realized that certain
types of husbands and wives would occasionally come to blows
after which they would do one of two things: they would either
go their separate ways or effect some kind of reconciliation, real
or apparent. The judges feared that if they held out to the
quarrelling wives the prospect of taking revenge upon their
husbands by suing them for punitive damages, the wives might
be thereby induced to choose the alternative of separation
rather than that of reconciliation.
Whatever the merits of this tenuous argument may have
been (after 1914 it was vigorously rejected by several courts),
2 2
it is completely irrelevant to the kind of suit that one spouse
brings against the other today to recover compensation from
the insurer. The spouses have no quarrel with each other. They
are trying to establish a claim to compensation to recoup the
family finances. Yet the older cases involving real and bitter
quarrels still repose in the reports and may be cited for the
principle (absurd when torn from its context) that interspousal
suits disrupt the harmony of the home.
In the present day context of traffic injuries, the marital
immunity operates like the anti-guest statutes to protect
insurance counsel from the unpleasant duty of defending
collusive lawsuits. Its effect upon the injured spouses is much
harsher, however, than that of the anti-guest statutes upon
injured guests. For the anti-guest statutes always permit
recovery under some circumstances (wanton and willful
misconduct, gross negligence, etc.), and have various other
loopholes which the courts can exploit for the plaintiff's
21. For discussion and citation of the nineteenth and early twentieth
century cases see Hancock, The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye, 29
U.Chi. L.Rev. 237 at 238.
22. See id. at p. 240, footnote 17.
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benefit.2 But the marital immunity constitutes an absolute
and inflexible bar to recovery by either spouse against the other
for any personal tort.
When a husband and wife are involved in a two-car
collision, the marital immunity can affect the obligations of
other parties (and their insurers), as well. Suppose that in a
marital immunity state a husband is injured in a two-car
collision caused by the negligent driving of his wife and that of
the other car's driver. The injured husband will, of course, have
a cause of action against that driver. Since the wife's negligent
driving partially caused the husband's injuries, it might be
thought that she (or her insurer should contribute to the
payment of the husband's damages. But since contribution is
normally exacted only from persons directly liable to the
injured party, the marital immunity precludes any claim to
contribution and the entire burden of the husband's damages
must fall upon the negligent driver of the other car.
6. The Marital Immunity; Choice of Law Cases.
Let us turn now to the choice of law cases decided by courts
that have adopted a governmental interest, policy determined
methodology. Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co.,2 decided in
1968 by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, is one of the most
important decisions but some preliminary hypothetical ex-
amples will expedite our understanding of its unusual pattern of
facts and laws. Wisconsin has abolished the marital immunity.
Suppose that in a purely domestic case the wife's negligent
driving has caused injury to herself and a minor child riding
with her in a one-car accident. Though the wife has not harmed
her husband's person, she has put him to some expense; under
Wisconsin law she would be liable to him for his out of pocket
expenses in providing medical care for her and the minor child
and for the loss of their services and companionship. Suppose
further that the wife's negligent driving has resulted in a two-car
collision also partially due to the negligence of the owner-driver
of the other car; under Wisconsin law the wife and the
owner-driver of the other car would each be liable for
23. See Linden, quoted in note 33, supra (parts 1 and 2)
24. 38 Wis.2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968).
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contribution to pay the husband damages. The amount of
contribution would be based upon the comparative degree of
negligence of each of the contributing parties.2
In the Zelinger case, the husband, wife and minor child
were all domiciled in Illinois whose legislature in 1953 had
taken the unusual step of embodying the marital immunity in a
statute.2 6 The wife-driver and minor child became involved in a
collision in Wisconsin with a truck owned by a Wisconsin
corporation. The husband brought suit against the Wisconsin
corporation (and its insurer) for the costs of medical care for his
wife and child and for the loss of their services and
companionship. The defendants counterclaimed against the wife
and her insurer for contribution as provided by Wisconsin law.
By demurrer the wife and her insurer raised the defence that
under Illinois law she could incur no liability to her husband
and so could not be liable for contribution.
How did the Illinois statute relate to this case? Its function
of protecting Illinois insurance counsel from having to defend
collusive suits was not here involved for two reasons: the suit
was not in Illinois and the litigation was not collusive. It was to
the advantage of both spouses to throw the burden of the
husband's loss upon the defendant corporation rather than the
wife and her insurer. The Illinois statute would have protected
the wife from liability and that protection would have
benefitted her. On the other hand, two strong arguments
favored the application of the Wisconsin rule. First, the wife's
alleged negligence had violated Wisconsin's admonitory rules
and the usual penalty of civil liability should have followed.
Second, the Wisconsin rule imposing liability upon the wife
benefitted the defendant corporation by compelling her to
contribute to the compensation of the husband. If the Illinois
statute had been applied, the entire burden of the husband's
damages would have fallen upon the Wisconsin corporation or,
in an analogous case, upon an individual defendant citizen of
Wisconsin. The court held unanimously that the Wisconsin rule
imposing a duty to contribute upon the wife should be
enforced. Recognizing some element of conflict with the Illinois
statute, the court tried to resolve this by holding that the
25. See 38 Wis. 2d 98 at 111.
26. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 68, sec. 1 (1959).
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Wisconsin rule was the better law. The rule of marital
immunity, it observed, was derived from the common law
doctrine that a husband and wife were one person in the eyes of
the law. While this was historically correct, the better law
argument might have been strengthened by the further
observation that the marital immunity operates even more
harshly upon injured spouses and joint tortfeasors seeking
contribution than does the anti-guest statute which the court
had already rejected as anachronistic and unjust.
2 7
For several years prior to the decision of the Zelinger case,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court had utilized, in marital immunity
choice cases, an escape device formula that enjoyed wide
commentarial approval. This formula was completely rejected in
the Zelinger case. It had its origin in the Haumscbild case
28
decided in 1959, four years before the governmental interest
methodology came to prominence in Babcock v. Jackson. In the
Haumscbild case, a wife sued her husband for negligently
causing her injuries in a one-car accident in California where, at
that time, the marital immunity still prevailed. Both spouses
were domiciled in Wisconsin. Since California had no con-
ceivable interest in the application of its marital immunity rule
to a suit in Wisconsin between spouses domiciled there, the case
should have been easy to decide. But the court was still under
the spell of the traditional system which required the judges to
either follow the place of injury formula or avoid it by adopting
some equally simplistic and undiscriminating formula pointing
to the law of Wisconsin. The court chose to adopt the
alternative formula that the capacity of spouses to sue one
another should be determined by the law of their domicile.
Though this crude, undiscriminating formula enabled the
court in the Haumschild case to reach the correct result, its
application to other types of cases compelled the courts to
reach absurd results. In a case where a spouse domiciled in a
marital immunity state was injured in Wisconsin by the
combined negligence of the other spouse and a Wisconsin
citizen, the domicile formula enabled the negligent spouse to
throw the entire burden of the injured spouse's damages upon
27. In Heath v. Zellmer and Conklin v. Horner discussed in Part 2.
28. Haumscbild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d
814 (1959).
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the Wisconsin citizen.2 9 It would have prevented an injured
spouse, temporarily resident in Wisconsin but domiciled in a
marital immunity state, from obtaining compensation for
injuries inflicted by the other spouse in Wisconsin. 3" Never-
theless, several commentators hailed the marital domicile
formula as a sound rule 3 1 and the Reporter for the
Restatement (Second) enshrined it in a Tentative Draft.32 In
the Zelinger case, it was discredited and abandoned by the court
that had given it national prominence.
The Zelinger case is a very strong precedent for the
situation in which the negligent spouse relies upon the marital
immunity rule of the spouse's domicile to throw the entire
burden of the injured spouse's damages on the negligent citizen
of the state of injury. The type of case in which the injured
spouse makes a direct claim against the negligent spouse based
on the law of the state of injury can be distinguished in several
respects. 3 3 But since persuasive arguments can be advanced for
rejecting the marital immunity in both situations, it is more
than likely that a court that has rejected it in one type of case
will do so in the other.
An example of the direct claim type of case is provided by
Arnett v. Thompson34 decided in 1968 by the Supreme Court
of Kentucky. That state had abolished the marital immunity
but it still prevailed in Ohio as a common law rule. Though both
spouses were domiciled in Ohio, the wife sued her husband for
negligent driving causing her injuries in Kentucky. The most
obvious concern of Kentucky was that therapeutic creditors
29. See Haynie v. Hanson, 16 Wis.2d 299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (1962).
30. See the concurring opinion of Fairchild, J. in the Haumscbild case
7 Wis.2d 130 at 144.
31. See Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws (1962) 581-83; Jayme,
Interspousal Immunity, 40 Cal. L. Rev. 307 (1967); Felix, Interspousal
Immunity in Conflict of Laws, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 406 (1968).
32. Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Second) Tent. Draft n. 9, sec.
390G (1964). See now Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Second) (1971)
sec. 169. (Slightly less dogmatic.)
33. In the contribution situation (as distinguished from the direct
interspousal suit situation), recognition of the marital immunity causes a
hardship to the owner-driver of the second car and his insurer. There is no
element of collusion between the spouses and the injured spouse derives
no advantage from suing in the state of injury.
34. 433 S.W.2d 109 (1968).
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domiciled there should be paid for their costly services to an
injured transient. Assuming automobile liability insurance was
available, giving a tort cause of action to the injured wife would
ensure the payment of such Kentucky creditors. It could also
have been contended that Kentucky had a humanitarian
concern that persons injured on its highways should receive
adequate compensation.
How did the Ohio immunity rule relate to the case? Lyons
v. Lyons, 3S the latest Ohio decision had strongly emphasized
the policy of preventing collusive lawsuits: this policy was
irrelevant to litigation in Kentucky. The Lyons case had also
emphasized the preservation of domestic harmony; this doctrine
derived from the nineteenth century wife-beating cases, was
likewise irrelevant to the present case, a friendly suit that
involved no quarrel whatever between the spouses. The only
relevant policy of the marital immunity rule was that of
protecting the husband from liability. But since he apparently
did not want that protection, that policy must have seemed to
the judges to be one of little significance.
Unlike some of the courts whose decisions have been
considered, the Kentucky court made little attempt to analyze
the policies of the divergent rules or reconcile them. It simply
announced that it would apply the Kentucky rule because the
facts had sufficient contact with Kentucky to justify that result.
Had the court adopted Trautman's suggestion that each state's
domestic cases be examined, it would have discovered a very
plausible ground for rejecting the Ohio rule. In the case of
Damm v. Elyria Lodge3 7 decided in 1952, the Supreme Court
of Ohio had held that the marital immunity was no longer part
of the law of that state,3" marshalling against it judicial and
commentarial criticisma. But the results reached in the Datum
35. 2 Ohio 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533.
36. Again it should be noted that although Ohio may well have had a
policy of protecting Ohio insurers from collusive suits, so long as
Kentucky has a legitimate interest in holding the defendant liable, a
Kentucky court is not likely to be persuaded to exonerate him merely to
benefit his insurer. The insurance contract ought not to shield the insured
person from liability.
37. 158 Ohio 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952).
38. "In Ohio the Constitution and the pertinent statutes have the
effect of so modifying the common law rule as to authorize the
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case was also based upon an alternative ground; in Lyons v.
Lyons, decided 12 years later, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that this alternative ground was the true ground of the Damm
case and, in effect, revived the marital immunity in Ohio. The
opinion in the Damm case clearly indicated that the marital
immunity did not enjoy a strong consensus of judicial support
in Ohio. If the Supreme Court of Ohio did not strongly support
it, why should the Kentucky judges have done so? The situation
was akin to that of the Ontario anti-guest statute which had
consistently received a restricted construction from the Ontario
judges.
Slightly different from the Arnett case was Purcell v.
Kapelski,3 9 a panel decision of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in a diversity suit litigated in New Jersey. Under the
federal statute the court was, of course, obliged to decide the
choice-of-law issue as a New Jersey state court would have
decided it. A divorced wife claimed damages from her former
husband for injuries caused by his negligent driving prior to the
divorce. The accident occurred in New Jersey where the marital
immunity had been judicially abolished. At the time of the
injury, the spouses were married and domiciled in Pennsylvania
where the marital immunity was embodied in a vague and
elderly statute. Knowing that the New Jersey court had adopted
the governmental interest methodology, a majority of the
federal judges concluded, using that methodology, that a New
Jersey court would have applied the New Jersey rule in the
instant case. They stressed New Jersey's interest in securing the
payment of its therapeutic creditors. Though the wife had been
injured in a two-car accident, the owner and driver of the other
car who were New Jersey citizens had been exonerated of all
blame. The opinion pointed out, however, that had they been
found negligent along with the husband, New Jersey's interest
in securing to them a right of contribution against him would
have required the rejection of the Pennsylvania marital
immunity statute. In advancing this argument, the federal
judges apparently assumed that the New Jersey court would not
be likely to reject the marital immunity in the contribution
maintenance of the action by the plaintiff against her husband .. " 158
Ohio 107 at 121.
39. 444 F.2d 380 (1971).
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situation while recognizing it in suits involving only the two
spouses.
Like the Kentucky state court, the federal court did not
examine the Pennsylvania precedents to find some ground for
holding that the Pennsylvania statute should not be extended to
cover the present case. Had they done so, they would have
found what they were looking for. In Johnson v. People's First
Nat's Bank,4 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had held that
the Pennsylvania statute permitted a wife to sue her deceased
husband's estate for injuries inflicted on her by his negligent
driving. In support of this conclusion, the court had explained
the policy of the statute in these words: "The tort of a husband
or wife which visits injury upon the wife or husband results in a
cause of action; by reason of public policy such cause of action
cannot be enforced during coverture .... Death having
terminated the marriage, domestic harmony and felicity suffer
no damage from the allowance of the enforcement of the cause
of action."' 4 1 Thus the court held that the effect of the statute
was merely to suspend the wife's cause of action during
coverture. Though the Johnson case clearly indicated a
narrowing of the statute's scope by the Pennsylvania court, as
applied to the facts of the Purcell case, it went much further.
Since the parties had been divorced before the action was filed,
the Johnson case strongly suggested that the suit might have
been maintainable in Pennsylvania. Certainly, it is hard to
imagine that a New Jersey state court, having read the Johnson
case, would feel obliged to take the policy of the Pennsylvania
statute very seriously.
In sharp contrast with the two decisions last considered, is
the 1966 decision of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in
Johnson v. Johnson. 42 Massachusetts had retained the marital
immunity; New Hampshire had rejected it several decades
earlier. The wife sued her husband for injuries sustained in New
Hampshire; the spouses were domiciled in Massachusetts.
Having discussed its previous decisions involving the marital
immunity in choice cases and briefly noted certain differences
between the rules and policies of the two states, the court
40. 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958).
41. 394Pa. 116 at 121-22.
42. 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966).
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concluded "that the interspousal law of Massachusetts has such
a significant relationship to the issue in dispute as to overcome
the preference we would ordinarily have for the application of
New Hampshire law to determine the rights of persons
negligently injured on New Hampshire highways."
4 3
Since the important Massachusetts policy of protecting
insurers and their counsel from collusive lawsuits had no
application to a suit in New Hampshire, the decision raised an
obvious question: what important Massachusetts policy was at
stake that justified the abandoment of the New Hampshire rule?
The court appears to have been seriously misled concerning the
effect of the New Hampshire law upon the expectations of the
Massachusetts insurer. "If the defendant garaged his car in
Massachusetts, probably he had obtained insurance there and
this insurance was doubtless written with the laws of
Massachusetts primarily in view: the application of New
Hampshire law would expose his insurer to a greater risk than it
might reasonably have expected to run, given the Massachusetts
local law and the trend towards the choice of the domicile's
interspousal law in interstate cases."" a
The most obvious observation prompted by this statement
is that insurance actuaries, in fixing premiums, do not and could
not take into account the potential application of particular
rules of domestic law (such as the Massachusetts marital
immunity rule) or of general choice-of-law principles. To make
statistically reliable predictions of future losses, they must
necessarily use a vast body of highway accident loss experience,
including hundreds of claims that did not involve marital
immunity at all. Thus the premium paid by the defendant
would have been derived from a prediction (based on past loss
experience) of the total losses expected to be incurred by all
cars garaged in the same rating territory of Massachusetts,
regardless of what rules of law might affect the possible
outcome of individual lawsuits or the settlement of individual
claims. The suggestion that the application of the New
Hampshire rule would have exposed the insurer "to a greater
risk than it might reasonably have expected to run'' 4 s was pure
43. 107 N.H. 30 at 33.
44. 107 N.H. 30 at 32-33.
45. Ibid.
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fantasy. The injury to the plaintiff wife had, in fact, already
been insured against as a future loss to be incurred by a car
garaged in the rating territory where the defendant's car was
garaged.
Had the court not been misled by erroneous commentarial
speculations concerning the insurance rating process and the
insurer's expectations, 4 6 it would probably have followed the
New Hampshire rule. For, as the court rather vaguely
recognized, New Hampshire had a strong humanitarian concern
for the compensation of the plaintiff, injured upon a New
Hampshire highway, and for her potential therapeutic creditors
resident in New Hampshire. Even if the court had believed that
there was some slight element of conflict between the policies
of the two states, they could have justified enforcement of the
New Hampshire rule as enforcement of the better law. 47 For
the marital immunity is an obviously anachronistic doctrine of
46. The court, at the conclusion of the statement quoted above cites
Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 582-83 (1962). On p. 581 Ehrenzweig
concedes that insurers do not take particular rules of law into account in
calculating premiums but contends that they could and should do do. In
an article cited by Ehrenzweig, Morris, Enterprise Liability and the
Actuarial Process - The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 Yale L.J. 554
(1961) it is conclusively demonstrated that such refined calculations
would be utterly impossible and worthless for loss forecasting purpose. See
Currie's review of Ehrenzweig's book in [1964] Duke L.J. 424 at 452.
In Pryor v. Swarmer 445 F2d 1272 a three judge panel of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals was also mislead by the fantastic notion that
insurers, in calculating premiums, take into account particular rules of law
favorable to them. The case involves a very real conflict between the
Florida anti-guest statute, relied on by defendants who were domiciled
there, and the law of plaintiff's domicile (New York) which allows
recovery by guest passengers for ordinary negligence. The Court came to
the astomishing conclusion that in such a case the New York Court of
Appeals (whose action it was required to predict and follow) would have
enforced the Florida anti-guest statute. In support of their curious
conclusion the Court said "We think that we can safely assume that the
Swarmer's insurance premiums were calculated with Florida's guest statute
in mind. Thus Florida has a strong interest in protecting its insurer in the
present case." Id at 1277 (Italics added).
47. The New Hampshire court adopted the "better law" analysis seven
months after its decision in the Johnson case. See Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H.
351, 216 A.2d 781 (1966).
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the medieval common law,' 8 serving no rational purpose save
one that was irrelevant in the Johnson case: the protection of
insurers and their counsel from collusive lawsuits.
7. Erroneous Opinions and Constitutional Limitations
Though this article has chiefly focused on cases involving a real
conflict between the divergent rules and policies of two states,
attention will now be directed to a few erroneous opinions in
cases not involving any such conflict. Discussion of these
opinions will assist the analysis of true conflict cases because it
will show that certain judges have been beguiled and misled by
the same fallacious doctrines in both types of cases. Our
discussion of the erroneous opinions in false conflict cases will
also emphasize their vulnerability to constitutional attack, a
subject that has received less attention than it deserves from
courts and commentators.
In White v. Kings,4 9 decided by the Supreme Court of
Maryland in 1966, the pattern of facts and laws was similar to
that of Babcock v. Jackson. A guest passenger domiciled in
Maryland brought suit against his host-driver (also domiciled
there) for injuries caused by the latter's negligent driving in the
state of Michigan. Maryland had no anti-guest statute; that of
Michigan required proof of gross negligence or willful and
wanton misconduct. The judges were urged to adopt the
Babcock v. Jackson methodology and decisions adopting it in
other states were called to their attention. Nevertheless, the
court enforced the Michigan anti-guest statute. It observed that
the place of injury formula was "easy of application"' 0 as
compared with the methodology of the Babcock case and
referred to cases in which judges using that methodology had
encountered difficulties. The court decided to avoid such
difficulties by rigid adherence to the place of injury formula.
What the Maryland court did not seem to realize was that
its decision in White v. King was vulnerable to attack on
48. Where the marital immunity has been embodied in a statute, of
their common domicile, and the suit between the spouses is brought there
the court may well feel itself bound to enforce the statute. See e.g.,
McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966).
49. 244 Md. 348, 223 A2d 763 (1966)
50. 244 Md. 348 at 354.
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constitutional grounds. In a series of cases going back to the
turn of the century, the Supreme Court of the United States has
evolved the doctrine that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment (concurrently with the Full Faith and
Credit Clause), establishes limitations upon the power of state
courts to enforce rules of their domestic law in interstate
cases. 5 1 In two important landmark decisions,5 2 involving the
interstate coverage of Workmen's Compensation Acts (decided
in 1935 and 1939 respectively), the Court made it very clear
that when a state court enforces a rule of its domestic law in an
interstate case, the Due Process Clause requires it to show that
its state has a governmental interest in the enforcement of that
rule, i.e., that the facts of the case are so related to that state as
to bring it within the policy range of that rule. Moreover, these
cases and subsequent cases involving torts and insurance
contracts hold that when a state has a governmental interest in
the enforcement of its rule, it may enforce that rule
consistently with the Full Faith and Credit Clause even though
another state also has a governmental interest in the application
of its divergent rule.
Now if the Due Process Clause limits the power of a state
to enforce rules of its own domestic law in interstate cases, it
must certainly likewise limit its power to enforce the domestic
rules of other states. It would be absurd for the Supreme Court
to hold that the Constitution limited a state's power to enforce
its own rules, yet gave it a power to enforce the rules of other
states greater than that which they themselves enjoyed.' s And
in at least one decision,' 5 the Supreme Court has accepted the
proposition that the Due Process Clause limits the power of a
state to apply another state's law.
In White v. King, the state of Michigan had no interest
whatever in the enforcement of its anti-guest statute. So far as
the statute implemented a policy of protecting host-drivers
51. For a detailed discussion of the entire series of cases see Currie,
Selected Essays on Conflict of Laws (1963) Ch. 2 entitled "The
Constitution and the Choice of Law."
52. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S.
532 (1935); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission
306 U.S. 493 (1939).
53. See Currie, op. cit. note 5 at 197 and 266.
54. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
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from liability, it was irrelevant because the defendant was
domiciled in Maryland. So far as it implemented a policy of
protecting insurers and their counsel from collusive litigation, it
was also irrelevant because the litigation was in Maryland, on
the other hand, had a very obvious interest in the enforcement
of its rule which would have compensated an injured Maryland
citizen for his injuries upon a showing of ordinary negligence.
By enforcing Michigan's anti-guest statute in a case where that
state had no interest in its enforcement, the Maryland court
deprived the plaintiff of property without due process of law.
The decision in White v. King is also vulnerable to attack
upon the ground that the Maryland court denied to the plaintiff
the equal protection of its laws. Speaking generally,' s the
Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from discriminating
against a particular class of persons without some adequate
policy ground to justify such discrimination. In the common
case where a Maryland guest-passenger had been injured in that
state by the ordinary negligence of a Maryland host-driver, he
was entitled to recover full compensation. Thus the effect of
the decision in White v. Kings was to discriminate against a
particular class of Maryland guest-passengers injured by the
ordinary negligence of Maryland host-drivers for the sole reason
that they had been injured in states that had enacted anti-guest
statutes. How could such discrimination possibly have been
justified? It surely could not have been justified upon the
ground that analysis and comparison of the governmental
interests of the respective states might present difficulties in
future cases whereas the place ot injury formula was easier to
apply. Presumably it might have been justified by a showing
that Michigan, the state of injury, had a substantial interest in
the application of its anti-guest statuted. But, as we have seen,
no such showing was or could have been made. By its
unjustifiable discrimination against a particular class of Mary-
55. As compared with the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
clauses the impact of the Equal Protection clause upon choice of law
decisions has received singularly little consideration by the Courts. For a
suggestive and thoughtful exploration of this matter see Currie, op cit.
note 51, Ch. 11 entitled Unconstitutional Discrimination in Conflict of
Laws: Equal Protection.
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land guest-passengers injured by the ordinary negligence of
Maryland host-drivers, the Maryland court deprived them of the
equal protection of the laws of that state.
5 6
White v. King may be instructively compared with the
Delaware case, Friday v. Smoot, 7 already discussed in Part 3.
Delaware had an anti-guest statute permitting recovery only for
"intentional or willful and wanton misconduct"; New Jersey
had none. A guest-passenger domiciled in Delaware sued his
host-driver, also domiciled there to recover for injuries caused
by the defendant's ordinary negligence in New Jersey. The
defendant urged the judges to adopt a governmental interest
analysis hoping thereby to persuade them to enforce the
Delaware anti-guest statute. But the court chose (for reasons
that do not concern us here) to adhere to the place of injury
formula and enforce the New Jersey rule requiring no more
than ordinary negligence Although the opinion in Friday v.
Smoot, like that in White v. King, rejects governmental interest
analysis and adheres to the place of injury formula, it is much
less vulnerable to constitutional attack. For though the court
does not say so, the state of injury (New Jersey) whose rule
permitting recovery for ordinary negligence was enforced, had a
56. A type of case involving the marital immunity rule is open to
constitutional attack along the same two lines suggested in the textual
discussion of White v. King. In Landers v. Landers 153 Conn. 303 (1966) a
wife sued her husband for damages sustained by her resulting from his
negligent driving in Virginia. Both parties were domiciled in Connecticut
whose domestic law would have given her a cause of action. But the court
insisted upon applying Virginia's marital innumity rule and denied
recovery. Since the husband was not domiciled in Virginia and the
litigation did not take place there, no interest of Virginia was advanced by
the decision. Since the court enforced a rule of Virginia law against the
plaintiff in a case where Virginia had no interest in the enforcement of its
rule the court deprived her of property without due process of law.
Moreover all Connecticut wives who are injured by their husband's
negligent driving within the state recover full compensation from their
husbands' insurers. The Connecticut Court has harshly discriminated
against those wives who happen to be so injured in marital immunity states
without showing any sufficient justification therefore. Hence the court is
depriving these injured wives of the equal, protection of the law of
Connecticut. The fact that the court believed itself to be following the
majority rule scarcely seems a sufficient ground for harshly discriminating
against a particular class of persons.
57. 211 A2d 594 (1965).
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strong governmental interest in its enforcement. The require-
ment of the Due Process Clause that the state whose law was
applied should have an interest in its application was therefore
satisfied. While the decision clearly discriminated against
Delaware host-drivers who had injured Delaware guest-
passengers in a state having no anti-guest statute, this
discrimination could presumably have been justified on the
ground that the state of injury had a substantial interest in the
application of its rule permitting recovery for ordinary
negligence.
To say that the opinion in Friday v. Smoot is less
vulnerable to constitutional attack than that in White v. Kings is
not to say that it met the Supreme Court's requirements in
every respect. The Supreme Court's decisions under the Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses clearly require a court
applying its domestic rule in an interstate case to demonstrate
its interest by relating the facts to the policy of the rule.
Though the Supreme Court has not explicitly applied this
requirement to cases in which the court of one state has
enforced the law of another, the argument is irresistible that the
same demonstration should be made. The Delaware court ought
to have spelled out New Jersey's interest in terms of the policy
and effect of its rule as applied to the facts of the case.
Opinions in which judges have clung to the place of injury
formula are not the only ones open to constitutional attack.
Judge Breitel's dissent in the recent New York case, Tooker v.
Lopez, 58 provides an obvious example. In that case, a father
brought suit to recover damages for the wrongful death of his
daughter. The plaintiff father, the deceased daughter and the
defendant were all domiciled in New York. Plaintiff's pleadings
charged that his daughter was killed while riding as a
guest-passenger in a car owned by the defendant and driven by
his daughter (also domiciled in New York) with his permission.
Only ordinary negligence on the part of the defendant's
daughter was alleged. Had the fatal accident occurred in New
York, the defendant would have been clearly liable. New York
had no anti-guest statute and its owner's liability statute would
have made the defendant liable for his daughter's ordinary
negligence in the use of his automobile. The accident did not,
58. 24 N.Y. 2d 569 249 N.E. 2d 394 (1969).
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however, occur in New York; it occurred in the state of
Michigan while the defendant and the defendant's daughter
were temporarily in residence at a college there. The fatal
journey was to have taken them from the college to a city in the
state of Michigan. The sole question argued before the Court of
Appeals upon the pleadings was whether the Michigan anti-guest
statute, requiring proof of negligence or willful and wanton
misconduct, should be enforced.
A majority of the court noted that New York had a very
substantial interest in securing to the plaintiff, domiciled in that
state, adequate compensation for the wrongful death of his
daughter, also domiciled there. Consideration of the policies of
the Michigan anti-guest statute clearly demonstrated that that
state had no interest whatsoever in its application. They
concluded that "New York has the only real interest in whether
recovery should be granted and that the application of Michigan
law would defeat a legitimate interest of the forum state
without serving a legitimate interest of any other state. ' 9
Strange as it may seem, Judge Breitel and two of his
colleagues held in a dissenting opinion, that the Michigan
anti-guest statute should have been applied. They did not, of
course, rely upon the simplistic place of injury formula that had
already been rejected in Babcock v. Jackson. Their argument,
though somewhat diffuse, relied heavily upon the technique of
collecting contacts; they stressed the fact that both the
deceased guest-passenger and her host-driver were temporarily
resident in Michigan, the fact that they entered into their
relationship there and the fact that the trip was to begin and
end in that state. The presence of these factual contacts with
the state of Michigan is undeniable but when considered in the
light of the two policies of the Michigan anti-guest statute, they
are seen to be totally irrelevant. No rational or legitimate
interest of that state could have been advanced by applying its
anti-guest statute to persons 6 0  entering into a host-guest
59. 24 N.Y. 2d 569 at 576.
60. If the driver of the car in which the decedent was killed had
survived and been sued, one might conceivably have made the rather
fragile argument that Michigan had an interest in protecting her from
liability because she was temporarily resident there. Whether New York's
strong policy should yield to this tenuous Michigan policy would then
become the crucial issue.
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relationship there or contemplating a journey from one point in
the state to another. The fact that the deceased guest passenger
and her host driver were temporarily resident in Michigan was
also insignificant for neither of them was even a party to the
lawsuit.
Neither Judge Breitel nor the majority considered the
constitutional implications of his dissenting opinion. In the light
of the foregoing discussion, it would seem to be at least highly
vulnerable to attack on two constitutional grounds. First, as has
been explained, the Due Process Clause prohibits a state court
from applying a rule of its own domestic law or that of another
state when the state whose rule is applied has no governmental
interest in the application of its rule. Since no interest of
Michigan would have been advanced by the enforcement of its
anti-guest statute, a decision to do so (as urged by Judge
Breitel), would have deprived the plaintiff of property without
due process of law. Second, since in an analogous but purely
domestic New York case, the plaintiff would have recovered
upon proof of ordinary negligence, a decision to apply the
Michigan anti-guest statute requiring proof of gross negligence
would have discriminated against his and all others similarly
situated. Presumably this discrimination could have been
justified by a showing that some legitimate interest of the state
of Michigan was being advanced. As we have seen, no such
showing was or could have been made. A decision to apply the
Michigan anti-guest statute based upon a collection of insignif-
icant contacts, would have been both arbitrary and pointless. It
would therefore have deprived the plaintiff (a New York
domiciliary suing another New York domiciliary) of the equal
protection of the laws of New York.
8. Conclusions
In Part I, attention was directed to the question why the New
York Court of Appeals decided to substitute governmental
interests analysis for the traditional choice of law methodology
in torts cases and why so many other state courts have followed
its example. The point was there made that interest analysis has
given the judges a more complete and realistic picture of the
choice of law problem and has emancipated them from the
simplistic place of injury formula with its distracting and
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misleading escape devices. In Part 7 attention was directed to
the question whether some of the opinions that have rejected
interest analysis (or taken it too lightly) are not vulnerable to
attack or constitutional grounds. Our conclusion was in the
affirmative. Some opinions have violated the due process clause
by enforcing a particular rule when the state whose rule was
enforced had conceivable interest in such enforcement. They
also appear to have violated the equal protection clause by
pointless and unjustified discrimination against certain classes of
injured persons.
It has been the chief purpose of this article to discuss the
problem of finding techniques of reconciliation in ostensible
true conflict cases. The first technique that was considered may
be conveniently labeled "domestic construction analysis." When
a judge is urged to enforce the anti-guest statute or marital
immunity rule of another state in a case whose facts fall within
the policy scope of a contrary rule of the forum, he should
study the purely domestic cases decided by courts of the other
state. If these cases evince a trend toward giving the anti-guest
statute or marital immunity rule a restricted construction, the
judge may conclude that he would be fully justified in giving it
a restricted construction in the choice case before him.
The use of this technique in relation to anti-guest statutes
has been fully considered. Though no employed in any of the
marital immunity cases, it might have been used in two of them
with devastating effectiveness. Had the Kentucky court, urged
to apply the Ohio marital immunity rule in Arnett v. Johnson,
looked more carefully into the Ohio decisions, it would have
discovered that in the Danm case, the Ohio Supreme Court had
all but abolished the marital immunity, only to revive it 12
years later in Lyons v. Lyons. Such judicial ambivalence
towards the marital immunity on the part of Ohio judges would
have lent strong support to its rejection by the Kentucky judges
in favor of their own state's governmental interests. Similarly,
had the New Jersey federal court, urged to enforce the
Pennsylvania marital immunity statute in Purcell v. Kapelski,
studied the Pennsylvania precedents, they would have found
that, as construed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that
statute merely suspended the injured spouse's remedy during
coverture. Since the litigating spouses in the Purcell case had
been divorced, a New Jersey state court would have surely felt
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justified in disregarding the Pennsylvania statute and imple-
menting New Jersey's governmental interests.
The second reconciliation technique, "better law analysis,"
differs from "domestic construction analysis" in that the judge
considers the anti-guest statute or marital immunity rule in a
larger perspective. Instead of confining his attention to
precedents of the state where the rule is in force, he will
consider whether the rule is anachronistic in its origins, whether
commentators tend to favor or oppose it in its modern context
and whether courts in any of the states where it is in force have
given it a restricted construction. The use of "better law"
analysis in anti-guest statute choice cases has been fully
considered.6" Though it has as yet been little used in the
marital immunity cases, its potential effectiveness there is very
obvious. For the marital immunity is even more anachronistic
than the anti-guest statute; the wife-beating cases that kept it
alive through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
have nothing in common with the modern traffic accident suit
between friendly, colluding spouses. In its modern context, its
practical effect is precisely the same as that of an anti-guest
statute - except that it operates more harshly as an absolute
bar to any recovery.
Some of the opinions that have been considered reveal the
use of two misleading and dangerous techniques of reconcilia-
tion that judges should be warned against. The first of these is
the technique of contact collecting. A judge who resorts to
contact collecting in an ostensible true conflict case tries to
justify the application of one state's rule by calling attention to
factual contacts with that state that are totally unrelated to the
policies of the rule in question. A depressing example is the
Scbneider case where the Minnesota court, having very properly
resolved to enforce Minnesota's ordinary negligence rule for the
protection of an injured guest passenger domiciled in that state,
proceeded to undermine and weaken its opinion as a
precedential guide by stressing several absurdly irrelevant and
insignificant contacts with Minnesota.
The second misleading and dangerous technique of
reconciliation that judges should eschew may be conveniently
labeled the technique of using "narrow neutral principles." The
61. In Parts 2, 3 and 4.
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chief objection to this technique is that it involves the implicit
assumption that anti-guest statutes and the marital immunity
must be treated, even in true conflict cases, as if they were just
as fair and well-adjusted to modern conditions as the rules with
which they are in conflict. Or, to state the objection in a
different way, the "narrow neutral principles" technique seems
to be completely inconsistent with the use of either of the two
other techniques herein considered.
The inconsistency between the narrow principles tech-
nique and the two other techniques is aptly illustrated by the
clash of judicial opinions in Cipolla v. Sbaposka. 6 2 In that case,
a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a
narrow, neutral principle, namely that a negligent driver,
domiciled in an anti-guest statute state who had injured a guest
passenger in that state (here, Delaware), should be entitled to
the protection of the anti-guest statute, even though the injured
guest passenger was domiciled in a state having no such statute
(here, Pennsylvania). Contrariwise, the dissenting judge used
both the other two techniques of reconciliation to justify the
application of the Pennsylvania rule. He showed that in a recent
choice case the Delaware Supreme Court had given its anti-guest
statute a very restricted construction. Moreover, he argued that
since anti-guest statutes had been criticized as anachronistic by
commentators and restrictively construed in recent domestic
and choice cases, the Pennsylvania rule was the better law.
To these arguments the majority made no reply whatever.
By adopting a narrow neutral principle they had, in effect,
accepted the implicit assumption that all domestic rules of law
must be treated as standing upon an equal footing, even in true
conflict cases. It would thus have appeared improper and
irrelevant to consider whether Delaware courts had restrictively
construed their anti-guest statute. It would have appeared even
more improper and irrelevant to have inquired which was the
better law. On the other hand, the domestic construction and
better law techniques are not so unrealistic and they explicitly
raise these very questions.
Judges who are attracted by the technique of narrow
neutral principles should consider the discouraging experience
62. 439 Pa. 563, 267 A2d 854 (1970).
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of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin with its use. In the
Haumscbild case,6 3 decided in 1959, that court adopted a
seemingly harmless, relatively narrow principle. Its operation
was confined to cases where interspousal tort liability was
alleged; it held that this narrow issue should be determined by
the law of the spouses' domicile. This principle had strong
commentarial support, both before and after its adoption. For 8
years, the Wisconsin courts loyally adhered to it, even when it
operated to the obvious disadvantage of Wisconsin citizens. But
it could not long endure the realism of governmental interest
analysis. In the Zelinger cases of 1968,61 this narrow neutral
principle was reconsidered and unanimously rejected.
Use of the better law analysis suggests the possibility that a
thoughtful, well-reasoned opinion in a true conflict case
involving the marital immunity rule or anti-guest statute of a
sister state might create a climate of opinion in that state that
would lead to a re-evaluation of the rule or statute in question.
Many state court judges and legislators take pride in the fairness
and progressiveness of their states' laws; they would not want
any of them to be regarded as anachronistic or as "a creed
outworn." '6 s The marital immunity would be particularly
vulnerable to such criticism. In most of the states where it
remains in force, it has only the status of a common law rule. A
pointed but persuasive criticism by a respected sister-state judge
might well provide the occasion for its reconsideration and
rejection as anachronistic common law.
Thus, the continued use of the better law technique in true
conflict cases may well serve as a modest stimulant to thr
progressive abandonment of such outmoded and unsatisfactory
domestic rules as the anti-guest statutes and the marital
immunity.
63. 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
64. 38 Wis.2d 98, 156 N.W. 2d 466 (1968).
65. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's comment on the Illinois anti-guest
statute. See 38 Wis. 2d 468 at 485.
